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POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF PENSION PLANS
ON AGGREGATE NATIONAL SAVING
Given the sample results for personal saving, we fall short of knowing
the total effect on national saving by the effects on business and gov-
ernment saving. No empirical evidence has been presented elsewhere
for these two sectors, and none is presented here. Yet the range of
possible effects seems limited on general grounds, and the following
discussion of each sector presents some tentative conclusions.
1. Business Saving
If employers' contributions to pension funds affect business saving
(that is, retained earnings), they very likely do so by affecting profits
via labor costs. The key to the effect of pensions on business saving,
therefore, is the effect on total labor costs. Increases in pension benefits
are typically not offset by reductions in take-home pay, and so usually
raise total labor costs. The increased cost may exceed the rise in labor
productivity, and so may reduce profits or raise selling prices. If prices
cannot be raised commensurately, profits fall. The rise in labor costs
in real terms is an initial effect, however, and may disappear in the
long run. Even if it does not, the importantquestion is whether the
increase in costs from raising pension benefits is higher or lower than
it would otherwise be. During World War II and part of the Korean
War, firms could raise total wages to attract workers only by raising
certain fringe benefits; wage controls fixed the maximum level of take-
home pay, the actual amount of which was nearly always at the maxi-
mum level. Since then, firms can raise wages freely through either
channel, and it is not obvious that total labor costs are affected by
whether part finances pension benefits or all goes into pay checks.
A clever strategy in the bargaining game to subdue over-all demands
by unexpectedly yielding ground on pension benefits might even keep
total labor costs lower than they would otherwise be for a short time,-'— —
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but a comparable tactic could be used just as well to produce a victory
for the other side. Labor costs would be higher than otherwise if firms
found that they could attract better workers with larger pension bene-
fits than with higher take-home pay. But better workers presumably
have higher productivity, so that total labor costs per unit of output
need not increase. Or increased pension benefits may improve com-
munity relations, in which case they are a substitute for advertising or
more conventional public relations. Properly interpreted, total labor
costs have not increased at all, though they now include certain ex-
penses previously listed under public relations.
One might still argue that labor costs are affected in two ways, one
increasing and the other decreasing them. The first argument is that
corporate managements are and have been willing to forego some
profits in order to finance pensions, but will not voluntarily do so in
order to increase take-home pay. This may be interpreted as a pater-
nalistic concern for the welfare of employees and their families. In
economic terms, it may be called an increase in the cost of employing
large numbers of workers, which is consistent with the spread of pen-
sion plans first among the large corporations. The cost arises from
social pressure and the need for good public relations, but it cannot
be covered by higher selling prices and so falls on the equity capital
of the business. In the long run, of course, the lower return on capital
may reduce the flow of new equity capital into such businesses in favor
of small companies not subject to these costs, but this is a very long-
run consideration of uncertain importance. In this view, therefore,
management grants pension benefits for noneconomic reasons, not
simply to attract and hold workers, and charges this beneficence to
the stockholders.'
The second argument is that pension plans increase corporate profits
because of the efficiencies introduced. Pension plans help to retire
workers at a set age and to preserve some flexibility in the organization.
In addition, turnover of young workers is a serious problem that pen-
sion plans help to reduce, especially if fully vested rights are withheld
1Anotherpossibility is that if firms do not set up an independent trust to admin-
ister the pension fund, they can borrow now from their future obligations, possibly
more cheaply than they could from the market. Most corporations, however, are
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from younger workers.2 And even with full vesting, there is an im-
provement in labor productivity attributable to the psychological
benefits to older workers of a formal retirement plan and to younger
workers of good chances for advancement as superiors retire at specific
ages. In this view, therefore, pension costs are more than offset by
various efficiencies, hence total labor costs are reduced and profits rise.
It may be questioned whether a factor of production can have its
return reduced even though demand and supply conditions do not
change, as does capital in the first argument; or even though its pro-
ductivity rises,as does labor in the second argument. There are
certainly more plausible explanations for the rapid growth of pension
plans since World War H. Yet some firms may have adopted pension
plans for such reasons. How the plans affect profits in general can only
be determined by the evidence on comparative profits. One could test
these hypotheses by comparing the profits of corporations with and
without pension plans, after adjusting for other factors, but this would
be a difficult task. Until convincing evidence either way is presented,
therefore, the most plausible conclusion is that the form of payment
does not have a large long-run effect on the level of profits. Hence, if
(before-tax) profits are nearly the same as they would otherwise be, so
presumably is business saving.
The only qualification is that business taxes might not be the same,
which involves the broader relation between pension contributions and
the level of taxation. We may treat this as part of the effect on the
government sector.
2. Government Saving
The immediate effect on the government of increasing pension con-
tributions by employers is the loss of federal tax revenue. Employers'
2 It has been suggested that pension plans help to reduce turnover specifically of
employees who receive on-the-job training. An employer who wanted to improve his
workers' productivity through a company-paid training program might be willing
to make such investments and to increase his workers' gross pay (to keep them from
going elsewhere with their better training and higher earning power) only if the
increase is partly recoverable should some of these workers leave, as the increase
would be if paid into a pension plan with vesting at or near retirement only. When
pension plans are instituted for this reason, total labor costs will surely rise; but, if
the training is effective, labor costs (including cost of training) per unit of output
should fall. Otherwise there would be no point to the training. See Gary S. Becker,
Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis With Special Reference to
Education, New York, NBER, 1964, p. 27.Possible Effects on National Saving 79
contributions and interest earnings of pension funds are not taxed as
income to employees until received as retirement income. (This applies
to pension plans of nonprofit corporations and government workers as
well.) The federal government therefore fails to gain as much increased
revenue from rising incomes (for some time at least) as it would if this
exemption were not granted. As a result, it must either spend less than
it otherwise would or, barring that, raise more revenues from other
taxes and borrowing than it otherwise would. Obviously there is no
way of telling, even on a general level, what the government did in the
past and will do in the future solely in response to this loss in revenue,
which is but one of many factors that affect the federal budget. Much
less can we say which expenditures or taxes have been and will be
affected. Broad generalizations must suffice.
Saving by the government, defined as cash income less cash expendi-
tures, is presumably determined by factors far removed from the loss
of pension revenue and is little affected by it. This is one of many
possibilities, but it seems the most likely one. If so, the relevant con-
sideration is the effect on private saving of the lower expenditures or
higher other taxes resulting from the loss of pension revenue. Insofar
as expenditures are the net change in national saving can be
measured by the change in private saving (already discussed) that re-
sults from the rise in pension contributions; the reduction in gov-
ernment expenditures by itself does not directly affect saving in the
economy. (Any long-run effects of different levels of government ex-
penditures on the growth in national income are too problematical to
warrant attention here and may be ignored.) Insofar as taxes are higher
on personal and business income, private saving will be reduced; in-
sofar as they are higher on consumption, private saving will be reduced
by less or even raised slightly because of the stimulus thus provided to
substitute future for present consumption.
The maximum offset to the rise in personal saving produced by
pension contributions occurs, therefore, if the government recovers the
loss in revenue by a tax on income. Suppose, then, the government
recoups by raising the tax on personal or corporate income. How much
can this offset be? For every dollar that employers place in pension
3Asone possibility, the growth of pension plans might lessen old-age assistance
grants, though this is not likely until the plans spread to almost all, particularly
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funds instead of pay checks, the loss in income taxes is at least 20 cents;
on the average it may be as much as 30 cents. Let us use the latter
figure as the upper limit. In raising 30 cents from the personal income
tax, the government forces individuals to reduce over-all expenditures,
of which at most 10—20 per cent on the average will come out of saving;
hence the reduction in personal saving from the 30 cent tax is about
3—6 cents. In raising 30 cents from the corporate income tax, the gov-
ernment cuts after-tax profits at most by that amount. (Part of the tax
may be shifted.) Corporations tend to retain a third to two-thirds of
profits as saving, hence the reduction in corporate saving is roughly
10—20 cents.4 At most, therefore, private saving is reduced by 20 cents
for each dollar of employers' contributions to pension funds. Since
employers contribute half or more but not all of the total, the net in-
crease in national saving exceeds 80—90 per cent of the growth in
pension funds.5
3. Summary
These calculations are extremely rough and depend on certain as-
sumptions, yet they place the relevant magnitudes in perspective. The
outside limit on the offset to employers' contributions seems to be a
fifth, and more plausible assumptions (such as that any increase in taxes
is levied on both corporate and individual income and that the cor-
porate income tax is partly shifted) would put it considerably lower.
We therefore conclude that the effect of the net growth in pension
funds on national saving equals the effect on aggregate personal saving
less zero to 20 per cent of employers' contributions.
This result takes benefit payment and interest earnings more or less
as given. As benefits grow relative to contributions in the future, the
estimates must be adjusted accordingly.
4 The reduction in dividends by these figures will be 20—10 cents, respectively, and
so will also cut stockholders' saving, but this will be negligible. Unincorporated
business profits are largely taxed under the personal income tax. The effect on the
saving of these businesses, because of their high average saving ratios, is probably
more like that on corporations than it is on individuals.
5 Challis Hall discusses different possibilities. See his "Retirement Contributions,
the Spending Stream, and Growth," in Joint Economic Committee on the Economic
Report, Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability, Washington, 1955,
pp. 786—797.